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Abstract 
Recent characterisations of self-organising systems depend upon the presence of a ‘Markov 
blanket’: a statistical boundary that mediates the interactions between what is inside of and 
outside of a system. We leverage this idea to provide an analysis of partitions in neuronal 
systems. This is applicable to brain architectures at multiple scales, enabling partitions into 
single neurons, brain regions, and brain-wide networks. This treatment is based upon the 
canonical micro-circuitry used in empirical studies of effective connectivity, so as to speak 
directly to practical applications. This depends upon the dynamic coupling between functional 
units, whose form recapitulates that of a Markov blanket at each level. The nuance afforded by 
partitioning neural systems in this way highlights certain limitations of ‘modular’ perspectives 
of brain function that only consider a single level of description.  
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Introduction 
  
Scientific investigation in neurobiology often begins – perhaps only implicitly – by partitioning 
the brain into functional units. While the most obvious partition of neural tissue is into 
individual neurons, the same process takes place over a range of spatiotemporal scales. The 
division of the cortical surface into Brodmann areas represents one such carving up of neural 
tissue (Brodmann, 2007; (Zilles and Amunts 2010). Brodmann maps have enduring practical 
implications. For example, the Talairach Atlas (Talairach and Szikla, 1980), commonly in use 
in neuroimaging, may be seen as a direct descendent. In this setting, the assumption is that 
brain function depends upon interactions between architectonically defined brain regions 
(Lazar, 2008). This assumption underwrites the study of connectivity in the brain, as we need 
to know what is being connected. Effective connectivity studies go as far as to distinguish 
between connections ‘intrinsic’ or ‘extrinsic’ to a given region (or cortical column) (Tsvetanov, 
Henson et al. 2016, Zhou, Zeidman et al. 2018). Again, this rests upon drawing boundaries 
around parts of a brain. Our focus in this paper is on how such boundaries may be licensed.  
A prominent justification for drawing boundaries – from the last century – is the 
‘modularity of mind’ paradigm (Fodor 1983), which itself inherits from the phrenology of the 
century before that (Gall and Lewis 1835). This conceptualisation of cognitive processes 
depends upon discrete cognitive units that interact with one-another, which might manifest in 
the tissue engaged in cognitive operations. An important limitation of this paradigm is that it 
typically only considers a single level of description, neglecting the rich intrinsic and extrinsic 
dynamics across regions and microcircuits. In addition, the philosophical assumptions of 
modular perspectives on neuronal organisation have been criticised (Friston 2002; Colombo, 
2013; Palecek, 2017; George and Sunny, 2019; Hipólito and Kirchhoff, 2019). In short, this 
calls for a more nuanced treatment of partitions and functional interactions. 
A growing literature leverages the Markov blanket construct (Pearl 1988) to formalise 
dynamic coupling in physical and biological systems (Friston, 2019, Hipólito, 2019, Ramstead 
et al., 2018a, Ramstead et al., 2019a, Palacios et al., 2020, Kirchhoff et al., 2018). This 
construct is a description of the dependencies within and between random dynamical systems 
– like the brain – that sets a boundary between the inside and outside of each system. Here, we 
focus upon the Markov blankets implicit in the kinds of models used practically in investigating 
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brain function. Specifically, we examine the dynamics implied by neural mass models1 of the 
kind that underwrite Dynamic Causal Modelling (DCM) (Bastos, Usrey et al. 2012, Moran, 
Pinotsis et al. 2013). Building from this to the connectivity of a canonical cortical microcircuit, 
we set out a series of Markov blanketed structures at increasing spatial scales. 
This approach endorses the segregation of the brain into regions but also emphasises 
the absence of a privileged scale of description at which 'modules' might be defined. By 
selecting a Markov blanket, we implicitly identify the variables that define the simplest element 
of our system at a given scale. It follows that, depending on the scale of interest, the variables 
comprising the Markov blanket will be different. For a single neuron, the blanket includes the 
presynaptic and postsynaptic membrane potentials that mediate its interactions with other 
neurons. For cortical columns, the blanket will include neural populations mediating 
interactions between different columns. In principle, the identification of functional boundaries 
can proceed at finer (ion channels and molecules) and coarser (networks, brains, and people) 
levels. 
While identifying blankets at each level may seem an abstract exercise, it has important 
implications for experimental neuroscience. Specifically, it offers an important part of the 
conceptual analysis we need to ensure our hypotheses make sense (Nachev and Hacker 2014). 
For example, if we want to know whether condition specific differences in measured brain 
activity are mediated by changes in ‘intrinsic’ or ‘extrinsic’ connectivity (Zhou, Zeidman et al. 
2018), we need to be able to define what we mean by these terms, and to say what they are 
intrinsic or extrinsic to. We aim to make this explicit in a series of examples. 
The aim of this paper is to argue that an appeal to the Markov blanket construct provides 
a formal basis for partitioning the brain into functional units – from individual neurons to 
functional assemblies of neurons, through to independent brain regions and networks of 
regions. In particular, we will argue that a recursively iterated version of the formalism, where 
each component of a Markov blanketed system is itself a Markov blanketed system, is apt for 
the task. This paper comprises four parts. The first provides a brief overview of the Markov 
blanket construct and its relevance to a dynamical setting. The second section zooms in on the 
individual neurons and illustrates how synaptic dynamics conform to the conditional 
independence structure of a Markov blanket. The third takes a more detailed look at the 
asymmetries of the neuronal Markov blanket, and emphasises the need for these to be replicated 
 
1 We will occasionally appeal to technical terms that are in common usage in this field. 
Please see the glossary for definitions. 
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at the network level. The fourth section zooms out and shows how the same structure is 
recapitulated at larger spatial scales. 
 
 
1. Markov blankets 
 
The Markov blanket construct, which underwrites the current proposal, was introduced 
into the literature by Pearl (1988) in the context of statistical inference. To distinguish a set of 
systemic (or internal) states from their embedding environment (of external states), a third set 
of states are implied. These are the Markov blanket (Friston, 2013). The Markov blanket 
consists of sensory states, which affect but are not affected by internal states; and active states, 
which affect but are not affected by external states (Figure 1). This implements a form of 
conditional independence between internal states and external ones.  
A Markov blanket (b) around internal states μ – where all other (external) variables are 
labelled η – is defined as the set of variables that renders μ conditionally independent from η. 
Mathematically, this is written as follows: 
                                                              
 (1) 
 
Equation 1 illustrates this dependency structure in the factorisation of the joint distribution 
conditioned on blanket states into two independent distributions; by definition, two variables 
are conditionally independent if and only if their joint probability, conditioned on some third 
variable, is equal to the product of their individual probability conditioned on that third 
variable. It is common to speak of the random variables separated in this way by Markov 
blankets – and the associated conditional dependencies – in terms of ‘parents’ and their 
‘children’, where ‘parent’ nodes cause their children. A Markov blanket is then the set of the 
parents, the children, and the parents of the children of the variable in question. An alternative 
way to frame this is to think of the parents as mediating the influence of external states on 
internal states (i.e., sensory states) and the children (and their parents) as mediating the 
influence of internal states on external states (i.e., active states). This suggests a separation of 
blanket states into active (a) and sensory (s) states. 
 
 
| ( , | ) ( | ) ( | )b p b p b p bµ h µ h µ h^ Û =
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Figure 1. Markov blanket. A Markov blanket highlights open systems exchanging matter, 
energy or information with their surroundings. Variables 𝜂 are conditionally independent of 
variables 𝜇	by virtue of its Markov blanket (b). If there is no route between two variables, and 
they share parents, they are conditionally independent. Arrows go from parents to children. We 
will use the colour-scheme in this figure consistently through subsequent figures. 
 
 
In a dynamical setting (Friston, Da Costa et al. 2020), Equation 1 means that the average 
(represented in bold) rate of change of each component of a Markov blanketed system can only 
depend on two other sorts of state in order to preserve the structure of Equation 1. This is shown 
in Equation 2 and Figure 2: 
 
 
 
 
(2) 
 
Equation 2 means that a dynamical system that preserves the conditional dependency 
structure of the Markov blanket ensures that the flow of internal and external states do not 
depend upon one another; i.e., that internal states cannot influence sensory states, and that 
external states cannot influence active states. Additionally, note that the Markov blanket 
structure is preserved if dependencies are lost (e.g., if the active states were not influenced by 
sensory states), but not if they are gained, since that would undo the conditional independence. 
We will see over the next few sections that this structure can be identified at numerous levels 
of a neural mass model (David and Friston 2003; Pinotsis et al. 2014; Moran et al. 2016).  
( , , )
( , , )
( , , )
( , , )
a
s
f
f
f
f
µ
h
=
=
=
=
μ μ s a
a μ s a
η η s a
s η s a
!
!
!
!
6 
 
Before we move on, it is worth briefly unpacking the reason for the names of the 
variables. While the Markov blanket formulation in general and applies to any random 
variables, recent work has leveraged Markov blankets to talk about the structure of exchanges 
between an organism and its environment (Friston, 2013; Kirchhoff et al. 2018; Parr and 
Friston, 2018,) and to describe self-organisation across spatial and temporal scales (Hipolito, 
2019, Ramstead et al., 2018b, Palacios et al., 2017). In this context, we associate the variable 
of interest with the internal states of a Markov blanket; which allows us to think of the ‘parents’ 
of that variable as mediating the influence of external states on internal states (i.e., as sensory 
states) and of its ‘children’ and the ‘parents of the children’ as mediating the influence of 
internal states on external states (i.e., as active states). This conception of the Markov blanket 
as the mediating influence of external states on internal states through the effects of sensory 
and active states resonates with the action-perception cycles typically considered in cognitive 
systems (Fuster, 1990; Parr and Friston, 2017; Parr and Friston, 2018). This is the reason for 
the words ‘active’ and ‘sensory’. While it may seem strange to use these terms for interactions 
at cellular or network levels, it should be emphasised that these are simply names for statistical 
constructs.  
 
 
Figure 2. This schematic illustrates the partition of states into internal states (purple) and 
hidden or external states (orange) that are separated by a Markov blanket – comprising sensory 
(green) and active states (blue). Specifically, it focuses on the dynamical formulation of 
Equation 2. Directed influences are highlighted with dotted connectors. Autonomous states are 
those states that are not influenced by external states, while particular states constitute a 
particle; namely, autonomous and sensory states – or blanket and internal states. Sensory states, 
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active states and internal states comprise the particular states that are constitutive of a functional 
neuronal unit (for more detail see Hipólito 2019). 
 
2. Neurons and their Markov blankets 
 
In this section, we consider the partition of brain tissue into neurons. From a dynamical 
perspective, this means finding equations of motion consistent with Equation 2 and Figure 2. 
We know that synaptic dynamics conform to the conditional independence structure of a 
Markov blanket, as the internal states (e.g., conductance of ion channels) of one neuron are 
distinguishable from the same states of other neurons, but interact through presynaptic and 
postsynaptic voltages. The implied partitioning of tissue into Markov blanketed neurons allows 
neurons to change their behaviour without losing their identity.  
Figure 3 shows explicitly how synaptic dynamics conform to the conditional 
independence structure of a Markov blanket. This is based upon the neural dynamics formalised 
in dynamic causal models (Bastos, Usrey et al. 2012, Moran, Pinotsis et al. 2013). This is one 
of many models of neural dynamics, and we have summarised common alternatives in Table 1 
with varying degrees of biophysical detail. As we said earlier, the existence of a Markov 
blanket implies a partition of states into external, sensory, active and internal states. The 
dynamics set out in Figure 3 assign these labels to the variables that preserve the form of 
Equation 2 – i.e., internal states evolve based upon internal and blanket states but not external 
states, active states do not depend upon external states, and so on. 
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Figure 3 Neuronal Markov blankets. This figure illustrates a Markov blanket separating the 
membrane conductances of a pair of neurons (or between one postsynaptic neuron and all 
presynaptic neurons). The A terms here are constants that act as connectivity strengths from 
the active state of one neuron to the external state of another (Aη), and from the sensory states 
of the latter to the internal states of the former (Aμ). When many neurons are in play, this 
becomes a connectivity matrix. The σ-function is a sigmoid shape and may be thought of as 
converting potentials to firing rates. An interesting feature of this structure is that the sensory 
states, from the perspective of a given neuron, can arise from many different external states 
(other neurons) while the active states (membrane depolarisation) depend only on the 
conductance (internal state) of the neuron being depolarised. Normal arrowheads indicate an 
excitatory influence, while round arrowheads show inhibitory influences.  
 
It is worth noting that Markov blankets do not trivially correspond to the boundaries of 
the neuronal cells. Rather, the idea is that the presence of a Markov blanket ensures the 
influences of blanket variables (here, membrane potentials) vicariously enable internal and 
external states (ion channel conductance) to communicate. This is fundamental because it 
means that internal and external states, though not influencing each other directly, are the 
common units that, when coupled, will determine the large-scale network. Moreover, as the 
blanket is defined in terms of dynamics as opposed to physical boundaries, which would 
correspond to the cell membrane at the neuronal level, we start to see how the same formalism 
applies even in the absence of clear spatial boundaries (Friston, 2013; Kirchhoff et al. 2018).  
At the neuronal level of description, the Markovian demarcation is not insulation of internal 
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states, but rather a way of highlighting (statistically) which states are relevant for the current 
investigation (Friston 2019; Hipólito 2019). Ultimately, the dependencies induced by Markov 
blankets create a circular causality: external states, such as the presynaptic conductance, cause 
changes in internal states, such as the postsynaptic conductance, via sensory states, i.e. 
presynaptic voltage, while the internal states couple back to the external states through active 
states, i.e. the postsynaptic voltage. 
  
Table 1 – Neural models and their blankets  
Model Dynamics States Citation 
Hodgkin–Huxley 
  
a – Membrane potential 
μ – Ion channels  
s – Injected current 
η – Electrophysiologist 
(Hodgkin 
and 
Huxley 
1952) 
FitzHugh–Nagumo 
 
a – Membrane potential 
μ – ‘Recovery’ variable 
s – Injected current 
η – Electrophysiologist 
(FitzHugh 
1955, 
Nagumo, 
Arimoto et 
al. 1962) 
Morris–Lecar 
 
a – Membrane potential 
μ – Potassium channels 
s – Injected current 
η – Electrophysiologist 
(Morris 
and Lecar 
1981) 
 
3. Blanket asymmetries  
This section deals with the way in which neurons – the basic units of Section 2 – may 
be connected together to form microcircuits (David and Friston 2003; Moran et al. 2013; 
Friston et al. 2019; Coombes and Byrne 2019) – which form the basic unit of Section 4. 
Specifically, we emphasise the key role of asymmetric interactions between blanketed 
structures. First, we take a step back to briefly highlight the way in which neurons may be 
studied in isolation. Neurons – as complex, dynamic systems – are highly sensitive to initial 
conditions, exhibiting organised patterns that result from localised interactions without 
centralised control (shown schematically in Figure 4). These non-linear interactions may be 
studied through electrophysiological experiments on single neurons. Typically, this means 
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using voltage clamp experiments and injecting electrical currents. A few examples of 
physiologically detailed models to account for these non-linear interactions are outlined in 
Table 1, and include the Hodgkin-Huxley model. This has many moving parts and is therefore 
rarely used in studies of connected neural populations – where dynamics more akin to those in 
Figure 3 predominate – but is a good starting point in understanding how sensory states 
influence the internal state dynamics. This will be essential when we move to sensory states 
generated by other neural populations in a network. 
 
Figure 4. On the left a centralised system, representing a central controller. This model is 
typically motivating modular theories, where a central cognitive system is bounded by lower-
level modules. On the right, a decentralised system where elements are not isolated from their 
environment, and the focus is on the dynamics of the relations among properties and elements. 
 
Intuitively, the Hodgkin–Huxley model expresses the evolution of the membrane 
potential under time-dependent input currents in terms of the equivalent electric circuit2, with 
a potential that evolves based upon membrane capacitance and currents. More specifically, the 
Hodgkin–Huxley model describes how action potentials in neurons are initiated and propagated 
through a set of non-linear differential equations that approximates the electrical characteristics 
of excitable neurons in a continuous-time dynamical system (Douglas and Martin 1991). 
Formulating the Hodgkin-Huxley (and other models) in terms of the constituents of the Markov 
blankets inherent in voltage-clamp experiments allows us to highlight the specifics of the 
influence of the external states (electrophysiologists) via sensory states (injected current) on 
internal states (ion channels), themselves influencing active states (membrane potential). 
Unpacking the Equation in Table 1 in terms of the specific ion channels, this is: 
 
2 Note that this is not what is meant by the term ‘microcircuit’, which refers to the ‘wiring’ of 
a population of neurons into a local network. 
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(3) 
Here, the capacitance (C) mediates the influence of an injected current (s) and ion 
channel currents on the membrane potential (a). This depends upon the ion channels of the 
system – i.e., the conductance of the sodium (Na), potassium (K), and leakage (l) channels. 
These depend upon constants (g) and the associated internal states (μ). In addition, it depends 
on the ‘reversal’ potentials for each channel (v) which specify the potentials at which the 
direction of ionic flow reverses. The internal states for each channel evolve based upon the 
(functions – α and β – of the) potential, as voltage-gated channels open and close to increase 
or decrease the magnitude of this flow. The nonlinearity inherent in Equation 3 facilitates many 
interesting biophysical phenomena, including bifurcations and limit cycles (Wang, Chen et al. 
2007). However, the purpose of this section is to move us away from the single neuron, and 
towards the kinds of dynamics exhibited by populations of connected neurons. This requires 
that we consider the blanket states that mediate these connections. The first step is to notice 
that the sensory state for the single neuron described by the Hodgkin-Huxley model is an 
experimental intervention, driven by an experimenter (i.e., an electrophysiologist, η) who 
injects current and measures the resulting potential. We need to move to a situation where this 
comes from other neurons. This is afforded simply by the equations of motion set out in Figure 
2 for a pair of neurons. 
To understand the way in which blankets connect to one another, it is useful to consider 
that the membrane potential (active state) of a given neuron can only be directly influenced by 
the conductance (internal states) of that neuron. In contrast, the presynaptic potentials (sensory 
states) of many other neurons contribute to the internal states. This asymmetry in the blanket 
states recapitulates that seen in physical systems. Specifically, the position of many different 
particles (sensory states) can influence the momentum (internal state) of a single particle. 
However, the position of the particle in question (active state) is only influenced by the 
momentum of that same particle.  This suggests a clear analogy between Newtonian mechanics 
and neuronal mechanics. Newton’s second law denotes that the rate of change of momentum 
of a body is directly proportional to the force applied. Conversely, this change in momentum 
takes place in the direction of the applied force, which itself can depend on position (e.g., the 
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force due to a spring). Rewriting this law, from the perspective of a single particle, in terms of 
a Markov blanket partition (Friston 2019), we have: 
 
 
(4) 
 For a single particle, a and μ are each 3-dimensional (each spatial dimension), while s 
can be many-dimensional, as each particle it describes will have three degrees of freedom. The 
second law of motion is consistent with neural mechanics in terms of dynamical functions 
described here in the sense that they both exhibit asymmetrical flow dependencies. This 
ubiquitous asymmetry is the key to moving to larger spatial scales, and networks of neurons in 
section 4. This rests upon the structure in Figure 5, which shows the asymmetric connectivity 
structure between cortical columns. The neurons, which each include conductance and 
potential variables, now themselves become parts of sensory, active, internal, or external states 
with respect to a cortical column. The asymmetry now manifests in forward and backward 
connections along cortical hierarchies. 
  
4. Cortical columns and networks 
  
This section deals with how the same Markov blanketed structure is recapitulated at a 
larger spatial scale: the cortical microcircuit. Neurons are themselves components of complex 
self-organising systems. A key characteristic of such complex systems is that they are greater 
than the sum of their parts: summing up all the interactions between constituent components 
would not give us the full story. The properties of a complex system cannot be sufficiently 
understood from the level of individual components. In the present context, the brain cannot 
be sufficiently understood from the perspective of interactions between individual neurons. 
Here we appeal to the canonical microcircuit model which uses the dynamics of Figure 3 but 
connects the neural populations as in Figure 5. In brief, this divides neural populations into 
superficial and deep pyramidal cells (which turn out to be out blanket states), spiny stellate 
cells and inhibitory interneurons. 
Considering the canonical microcircuit model has several advantages. First among 
these is the fact that it is used practically in the analysis of empirical brain data. This is because 
it can be used to specify models (i.e., hypotheses) of distributed responses – as measured with 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) or electroencephalography (EEG) – that are 
physiologically grounded (Friston, Preller et al. 2019). For example, it is possible to specify 
1
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architectures in terms of their forward and backward connections and experimental effects 
either as extrinsic (between region) or intrinsic (within-region) connectivity at a specific level. 
A third advantage is that it permits combining different imaging modalities in the form of 
multimodal Bayesian fusion (Wei, Jafarian et al. 2020).  
The above highlights its importance for hypothesis testing. A number of 
neuropsychiatric conditions cannot be tackled in a compartmentalised manner and benefit from 
the segregation into functional units (cortical columns) offered by these microcircuits. A good 
example is the case of schizophrenia, in terms of the dysconnection hypothesis (Yang et al. 
2015, Friston et al. 2016, Keher et al. 2008). The focus of the hypothesis is the functional 
disconnection of different brain regions, based on NMDA-hypofunction models of the disease. 
This has dramatic effects on both cortical neuronal and network activity. This hypothesis 
cannot be framed without knowing what is being disconnected from what. Similarly, questions 
about cognitive (e.g., attentional) function in health depend upon the same construct 
(Limanowski and Friston 2019). Other important questions, amenable to interrogation using 
the canonical microcircuit include questions about the nature of neurovascular coupling. For 
example, does it depend upon afferent presynaptic activity from extrinsic sources or (only) 
report to local activity mediated by recurrent (intrinsic) connectivity (Jafarian, Litvak et al. 
2020)? 
The brain organises itself in a decentralised way. A decentralised system, under 
complex systems and dynamic modelling theory, is a system whose lower-level components 
operate on local information to accomplish goals, i.e. control is distributed. The decentralised 
control is distributed such that each component of the system is equally responsible for 
contributing to the global, complex activity based on the component's interaction with other 
components (Deco et al. 2008; Chialvo, 2010; Zuo et al., 2010; Gliozzi and Plunkett, 2019; 
Hipólito and Kirchhoff, 2019). Figure 4 illustrates the distinction between centralised systems, 
i.e. a central controller exercising control (e.g. control fixed mechanism), and decentralised 
structures for patterns or behaviours as emergent properties of dynamical mechanisms. 
Markov blankets allow us to delineate the microcircuitry connections by nuancing their 
intrinsic connections and how they may also change within the same network. Laminar specific 
connections underlie the notion of canonical microcircuit (Bastos et al. 2012). As seen in Figure 
5 (second row), we can use the dependencies of this connectivity structure to provide a 
principled segregation into regions. Considering two columns – connected to one another – we 
see that if the internal and external states comprise the spiny stellate cells and interneurons of 
each column, the superficial pyramidal cells of one column act as the active states, while the 
14 
 
deep pyramidal cells of the second become sensory states. Unpacking this in detail, the absence 
of spiny stellate or interneuron connections to the superficial pyramidal cells of other columns 
is consistent with the absence of influence of external on active states. The reciprocal influence 
is in place, allowing active states to change external states. Similarly, connections from deep 
pyramidal to interneurons and superficial pyramidal cells in other columns matches the directed 
influence of sensory over internal and reciprocated influence between sensory and active states 
respectively. 
 
 
  
Figure 5 Cortical micro-circuitry. The upper schematic shows the connectivity of the 
canonical microcircuit as employed for DCM (Bastos et al., 2012). This comprises four cell 
populations with a stereotyped pattern of connectivity. From left to right, we show forward 
(ascending) connections. The opposite direction shows descending connections. The dynamics 
of each neural population shown here obey the equations given in Figure 3, where the 
likelihood mappings (or A-matrices) in those equations specify which populations are 
connected to one another. As further shown by Bastos et al. (2012), feedforward connections 
originate predominantly from superficial layers and feedback connections from deep layers, 
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thus suggesting that feedforward connections use relatively high frequencies, compared to 
feedback connections. The second row here shows the Markov blankets that underwrite the 
separation into distinct cortical regions (where the superficial and deep pyramidal cells play 
the role of active and sensory states respectively), and the final row shows a separation into a 
network of regions, where the middle two regions act to insulate the far left and right regions. 
 
 
What the Markov blankets in Figure 5 show is that, while a certain sparsity mediates 
interactions via blanket states, the internal states of a canonical microcircuit show strikingly, 
interconnected intrinsic architectures. In other words, we can highlight via Markov blankets, 
the interconnections between the neurons of origin and termination by highlighting intrinsic 
connectivity and extrinsic projections. This allows us to determine how top-down and bottom-
up processing streams are integrated within each cortical column. Ultimately, this emphasises 
that intrinsic (local) behaviour is highly dependent upon extrinsic (global) behaviour via 
specific pyramidal populations. In short, organised patterns are observed as resulting from 
localised interactions without centralised control. This observation is recapitulated when we 
zoom out further. 
Zooming out to a larger spatial scale, neuronal structures can be viewed as higher-order 
neural packets (Yufik and Friston 2017); i.e., as functional, larger-scale assemblies of neural 
packets, wrapped in their own superordinate Markov blankets. This is illustrated in the final 
row of Figure 5, where cortical columns now become the functional units comprising the states 
of a Markovian partition to define a network. Figure 6 takes this one step further, and expresses 
brain-wide networks as active, sensory, internal, and external states. Bounded assemblies at 
larger spatial scales are formed spontaneously, consistent with the self-organisation of complex 
systems defined as structures that maintain their integrity under changing conditions. 
Especially in approaches such as the one we suggest here, where coordination, segregation and 
integration are crucial for the self-organisation of the brain as a complex dynamic system. 
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Figure 6 A Markov blanket of networks. The image in this figure takes the ideas from Figure 5 
one step further and shows how we could treat the connections between nodes in different 
networks as dependencies between states in a Markov blanketed system. Here, the networks 
themselves become the active, sensory, internal, and external states. This graphic is loosely 
structured around the kinds of networks identified using resting-state fMRI (Razi et al., 2015; 
Sharaev et al., 2016; Betzel et al., 2014). However, the specific connections and anatomy 
shown here should not be taken too seriously. Here we treat the visual networks as internal 
states that reciprocally influence active states (dorsal and ventral attention networks). The 
default mode network then plays the role of the sensory states, which mediate the influence 
between the above and external (sensorimotor network) states. The assignment of these is 
equally valid if reversed, such that sensorimotor networks become internal and visual external. 
 
Markov blankets allow us to make salient the neuronal assemblies, as flexible but also 
stable biophysical structures. Put otherwise, structures such as these maintain their integrity 
under changing conditions. In this treatment, Markov blankets highlight the assemblies 
conserved over multiple levels of description, i.e. they are scale-free. Monitoring the variations 
in such larger spatial scales enables attributing to neurons, microcircuits, and networks the 
ability to undergo changes without loss of self-identity.  
  
4. Discussion 
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The crucial point for the Markov blanket, at any scale, is that its boundaries are dictated 
by flows that depend upon certain states. It is by their flexibility that Markov blankets allow us 
to explain dynamic couplings while still drawing statistical boundaries. Markov blankets 
demarcate boundaries of couplings from pairs of neurons, to cortical columns and brain-wide 
networks. The description of neural connectivity with Markovian formalisms allows zooming 
in and out, identifying different functional units at different scales. 
This has three practical consequences. The first is that it provides a conceptual 
endorsement of the DCM framework, which depends upon assessment of the effective 
connectivity between functionally segregated neural circuits. In brief, DCM rests upon two 
components: biophysical modelling using differential equations and Bayesian statistical 
methods for model inversion (parameter estimation) and comparison. This has many practical 
applications in analysing brain data acquired under a range of paradigms. For example, it has 
been used in the study of attentional modulation during visual motion processing (Büchel and 
Friston, 1997; Friston et al., 2003), in multisensory integration (Limanowski and Friston 2019), 
and in studies of clinical conditions (Dietz, Friston et al. 2014). Its role is to disambiguate 
between different hypotheses about how experimental conditions (like attentional set) 
modulate neuronal connectivity. With non-linear dynamic causal models (Stephan et al. 2008), 
non-linear DCM for fMRI enables the modelling of how activity in one population gains 
connection strengths, among others.  
The Markovian formalism provides flexible tools to accommodate co-existing and 
interacting elements, which play important roles for the optimal functioning of the system. It 
enables us to look at the organism by considering each and every level of complexity, without 
losing the unity of the simplest component. Neurobiology spans from the small scale of 
molecular biology to the social and environmental aspects of pathology; how to accommodate 
these different aspects in an inter-scale manner is the key challenge, and what we are proposing 
is a promising tool to face it. 
The persistence of Markov blanketed structures over time has a further interesting 
consequence. Such systems may be shown to behave according to a Bayesian mechanics  
(Friston 2019a) in which internal state dynamics may (on average) be expressed as gradient 
flows on Bayesian model evidence – or a bound on this quantity known as variational free 
energy. Once Markov blankets have been drawn, the neurons, cortical columns and networks, 
they all appear to dynamically self-organise under a common principle: the free-energy 
principle (Friston 2013). This says that any self-organising system will selectively interact with 
its environment to minimise free energy, thereby resisting the natural tendency to disorder and 
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entropy. This paper has sought to identify the Markov blankets in the brain. We hope in future 
work to unpack these in terms of active inferential processes, where post-synaptic ion channels 
may be seen as inferring pre-synaptic channels, stellate cells and interneurons infer their 
counterparts in other cortical columns, and groups of columns in a network inferring the 
internal states of other networks.  
 The treatment of neurons as if they were active agents, drawing inferences about their 
environments, has precedence in existing theoretical work. For example, Kiebel and Friston 
(2011) demonstrated how dendrites can self-organise to minimise a variational free-energy 
bound on surprise of their presynaptic inputs, demonstrating that postsynaptic gain is itself 
optimised with respect to variational free-energy. This provides a principled account of 
neuronal self-organisation built upon the optimisation of elemental neuronal (dendritic) 
processing. This agenda has subsequently been developed in theoretical (Palacios et al., 2019) 
and empirical (Isomura and Friston 2018) studies of neuronal self-organisation. 
Anticipatory mechanisms are shared by all living systems. Indeed, for an organism to 
remain alive, it must regulate – and therefore anticipate – the structure of its exchanges with its 
embedding environment, which evinces a role for prediction. In some organisms, especially 
those animals that possess a nervous system, anticipatory mechanisms are evident in patterns 
of organised behaviour and are made particularly evident by whole-brain dynamics over longer 
timescales. This motivates a specific research agenda in computational neuroscience: to 
investigate how microcircuits organise (and why they reorganise) on the local level and smaller, 
micro scales, crucially, without losing sight of the embodied brain. 
It is important to recognise the limitations of this paper. While we have outlined how 
dynamic Markov blankets may be identified, we have done so with known equations of motion. 
When these are not known, as in most practical settings, the interactions between variables 
must be estimated. In addition, we have largely restricted our conceptual analysis to how we 
partition systems into fundamental (at a given scale) units. The next steps will be to unpack the 
consequences of this partition both analytically and through numerical simulation, with a view 
to the variational inferential perspective touched upon in the discussion. We have provided the 
foundation for this, as once we know the external and blanket states, we know what the internal 
states must be ‘inferring’. This offers a well-formed scientific question as to the form of the 
implicit model the internal states use to engage in active inference – i.e., how do external states 
give rise to sensory states? Part of this work will be to ask questions about how brain networks 
self-organise. Finally, we hope to apply these ideas to the study of neuropsychiatric conditions. 
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Of special interest would be to develop experimental work on the span from neurobiology to 
social and environmental aspects of pathology, which is still missing a unifying link. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
  
This paper investigated the characterisations of neural systems as depending upon the presence 
of a boundary – or Markov blanket. That is a mediation of the interaction between what is 
inside and outside of a system. This treatment was based upon the canonical micro-circuitry 
used in empirical studies of effective connectivity, to directly connect this analysis to models 
used in neuropsychiatric and computational psychiatry research (Frank et al. 2016; Shaw et al. 
2020). The key point is that brain function depends upon the cooperative dynamics of networks, 
regions, and neurons. To talk meaningfully about these units of nervous tissue, we need a 
principled means of partitioning these from one another. This partition is afforded by the 
dependency and flow structure of a dynamic Markov blanket, whose structure is recapitulated 
each levels of analysis. This endorses the partition of neural systems at each of these stages 
(e.g., into neurons, regions, networks etc.), but also highlights the limitations of 'modular' 
perspectives on brain function that only consider a single level of description. In short, the level 
of analysis we choose to adopt defines a Markov blanket that tells us the appropriate functional 
units we need to consider. In all cases, these can be broken down into four classes of variable: 
active, sensory, internal, or external. In this light, the physics of the mind is consistent with the 
"enactive" view (Hipolito 2018), deriving cognition from an interplay between external 
conditions and self-organisation in the nervous system.  
  
GLOSSARY 
 
Canonical Microcircuit: Distributed network of relatively simple elements that give rise to complexity of cognitive 
processing by virtue of (1) their extensive interaction with other elements; and (2) their own intrinsic rich circuits. 
Originally introduced by (Douglas and Martin 1991) as a functional motif of interconnected neuronal populations that 
is considered to be replicated over the cortical sheet. 
 
Complex System: a system that is composed of many components which may interact with each other. Examples 
include Earth's global climate, organisms the human brain, or living cells. Their behaviour is particularly difficult to 
model due to the dependencies and relationships between their parts and the system with the environment. 
 
Decentralised system: local interactions between components of a system establish order and coordination to achieve 
global goals without a central commanding influence. Interactions are formed and predicated on spatiotemporal 
patterns, which are created through the positive and negative feedback that interactions provide.  
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Dynamic Causal Modelling: modelling treatment of the neural dynamics as a non-linear dynamic system. Differential 
equations describe the interaction of neural populations, which direct or indirectly give rise to functional neuroimaging 
data, particularly by parameterising over directed influences or effective connectivity, usually estimated using 
Bayesian methods. 
 
Emergence: traits of a system that are not apparent from its components in isolation, but which result from the 
interactions, dependencies, or relationships they form when placed together in a system. These components are 
impossible to predict from the smaller entities that make up the system. 
 
Neural mass models: models of coarse-grained activity of large populations of neurons and synapses especially useful 
in understanding brain rhythms and synchronisation.   
 
Non-linearity: Non-linearity describes systems with high dependence on initial conditions, current state, and 
parameter values. The differential equations of non-linear dynamical systems are non-linear in the states (and 
parameters; in other words, they have high order terms beyond linear coupling. 
 
Relative entropy: mutual information, or the uncertainty about particular states minus the uncertainty, given the 
external states. In other words, the information gained about one set of states, given another 
 
Self-entropy: entropy of particular states, i.e. of states that constitute a particle, namely autonomous and sensory 
states. Entropy is a measure of uncertainty, disorder or dispersion 
 
Self-organisation: a process of spontaneous pattern formation across time scales – from microscopic cells to 
macroscopic organisms – that entails the emergence of stable systemic configurations that distinguish themselves 
from their environments. 
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